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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to explore the main characteristics of religious change among the 
Hungarian youth and to assess the impact of the denominational schools compared to that of the 
religious upbringing in the family on their religiosity. Previous empirical studies have found a 
considerable level of unchurching in Hungary affecting first and foremost the membership of the 
highly institutionalized traditional churches. Recent scholarly literature emphasizes the 
significance of age explaining secularization process by age-, cohort- as well as life-cycle effects, 
therefore pointing to the importance of socialization agents. Based on a secondary analysis of 
the databases of three waves of Hungarian national youth surveys (Ifjúság, 2000, 2008; Magyar 
Ifjúság, 2012), we compare the religious commitment and religious behaviour of consecutive 
cohorts studied in different rounds. By linear regression analysis we aim to scrutinize the 
significance and the extent to which religious upbringing and attending religious schools 
mattered in the development of youth religiosity. We show that while the considerable drop of 
religiosity is a result of both within- and inter-cohort changes, the impact of upbringing in a 
religious family is significantly stronger than that of attending a denominational school. 
Keywords: youth, religion, socialization, denominational schools, unchurching, age-cohort-
period effect 
  
                                                 
1 This paper is based on the paper presented for the panel session on the sociology of religion at the 
annual conference of the Hungarian Sociological Association (Budapest, 9 November 2012). 




Youth religiosity in Europe and especially in the Central and Eastern European countries 
nowadays has become a more and more significant issue. Young people currently 
attending secondary school, being engaged in higher education, or entering the labour 
market may, within a few years, constitute a considerable part of active church 
membership (Ziebertz & Kay, 2006, 2008; Ziebertz, Kay & Riegel 2009). For churches in 
the post-socialist countries this is even more pressing to consider as volunteer service 
and donations are becoming indispensable also for traditional highly institutionalized 
churches which, during the communist regimes, have been deprived of their estates and 
are now depending on government subsidies. However, since a large part of their 
membership being retired now, it is undoubtedly of high necessity to carry over the 
young generation. 
Thus, well-known demographic and unchurching trends are quite alarming. While the 
Hungarian population, parallel to most European societies, has been ageing, the age 
composition of the membership of Hungarian churches also shows striking disparity 
contrasted to the total society. According to the 2001 Census data (Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal, 2002), the youth and middle-aged has been under-represented and the older 
generations have been over-represented among those having a denominational 
affiliation. Moreover, apart from some methodological uncertainties regarding the 
religiosity data, the first 2011 Census results suggest that these trends have been 
continuing throughout the past decade (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2013). The 
predictable tendencies for the next decades seem to be even less promising. Tomka 
(2010) asserts that deceased church-goers, especially in rural areas, have not been 
replaced by the youth because of having weaker religious commitment. Therefore, 
membership of all major denominations has been declining. Moreover, Tomka concludes 
that the traditionally elderly and rural profile of the churches is soon to disappear, that 
is, looking at a national level, the age structure is gradually becoming more balanced. 
Tomka adds as well that active engagement of the diminishing membership based on a 
personal commitment gradually takes the place of the traditional church membership. It 
can be raised, however, that this spread of religious belief based on a conscious choice 
will not necessarily benefit the traditional churches (Hámori, 2011), and the recent and 
prospected demographic trends may turn the apparently balanced age structure 
transitional. 
While this pattern is not unique in Europe, Hungarian results are surprising compared 
to some other Eastern European post–socialist countries – especially considering that 
after 1990, practicing religion in an institutionalized framework became considerably 
freer. What is more important, early sociological studies on religiosity showed a slightly 
increasing religiosity from the beginning of the 80s, and this trend has continued for a 
while even after the political transition (Tomka, 1998a, 1999). The reasons for this have 
been certainly complex. Besides the historical background, the political and institutional 
environment, the effectivity and institutional structure of the churches themselves 
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might also have played a role (Hámori, 2011; Tomka, 2009). Underlying these trends, 
micro-level (individual) factors can also be assumed, as religious commitment is 
arguably influenced by complex socialization processes. Thus, changes in the historical 
context will result in different socialization influences for different generations. 
Although religious commitment may become altered through the lifetime, it can be 
assumed that, in principle, religiosity of successive generations will mirror the different 
socialization context2. 
Denominational Education in Hungary 
A significant change in the environment of religious socialization has been that 
denominational pre-primary, primary, secondary and higher education institutions 
previously confiscated by the state have been re-established after the political 
transitions around 1990. In addition, a significant number of denominational 
educational institutions were newly established, too (Pusztai, 2006, 2012). The extent of 
the enlargement of denominational education system is illustrated by the fact that while 
before 1990 a total of 10 denominational educational institutions existed in the whole 
country, nowadays the Hungarian Catholic Church maintains 570 pre-primary, primary, 
secondary and 10 higher education institutions, and the Reformed Church in Hungary 
has 210 educational institutions (Katolikus Pedagógiai Szervezési és Továbbképzési 
Intézet, 2013; Magyaroroszági Református Egyház, 2011). 
Since 2000 the proportion of the attendees of church-run schools has increased at all 
educational levels. The rate of denominational school students is the highest among 
grammar school pupils: in the 2011-2012 academic year about every sixth young people 
went to a denominational grammar school. However, the rate of growth was stronger at 
lower levels of education: the rate of children going to denominational kindergarten or 
primary school has more than doubled in a decade (Figure 1). Taking every level of 
education into consideration, 155,690 pupils and students attend an educational 
institution run by a church, which amounts to 7.4% of all pupils and students in Hungary 
(Oktatási és Kulturális Minisztérium, 2012). 
  
                                                 
2 More on generational differences and age effects, see Földvári (2003), Rosta (2007), and Tomka (2010). 
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Figure 1. Proportion of those attending church-maintained institutions at different levels of education, 2001-2012 
 
Source: Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium, 2010, 2011, 2012, Oktatási és Kulturális Minisztérium, 2007, 2008, 2009; own 
calculations. 
Although these schools have performed public functions as well and they have been 
open to all regardless of their denominational background, from their start they were 
seen as institutions having a missionary task, and to contribute to the reproduction of 
religiously committed intellectuals (Bacskai, 2008; Kopp, 2007; Krafcsik, 2000). 
Although relatively short time has passed since the re-establishment of these 
institutions, it is questionable whether they functioned sufficiently or to what extent 
they have met these expectations. That is, the question is to what extent they are capable 
of coping with generational change and the socialization pressure of family background. 
The religiosity of the students of denominational secondary schools in Hungary has been 
studied the most intensively by Pusztai (2006). The results of her studies at the turn of 
the millennium suggested that among the parents of denominational secondary school 
pupils those who were religious according to the teachings of the church were clearly 
over-represented as compared to those measured in the parents' age group at the 
national level. However, pupils from these families were not in the majority in 
denominational secondary schools. Besides those who were religious on their own way, 
there were a considerable number of students who came from non-religious families, 
too (Pusztai, 2004). A more recent survey of hers covering not only regions in Hungary 
but also border regions in the Ukraine and Romania also found that only slightly more 
than half of the denominational secondary school students came from a family that 
showed some form of active religious characteristics (Pusztai, 2007). 
Pusztai observed a much higher proportion of various forms of religious practice among 
the denominational secondary school pupils than the proportion typical for this age 
group in Hungary. However, she also pointed out that the students coming from non-
religious families were in all regards less religious than their counterparts who received 
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religious upbringing. This difference was bigger among boys than among girls (Pusztai, 
2004). 
Pusztai’s research underlined that the most significant contextual effect on the 
religiosity of denominational secondary school students was the frequency of praying of 
the parents, which was actually an indicator of the religiosity of the family. In addition, 
the presence of religious friends and active participation in small religious communities 
were also important correlates of the self-reported intensity of religiosity. The impact of 
a denominational school on the religiosity of its students was primarily manifested not 
through the religious programmes it provided, but as an environment that might have 
provided a homogeneous system of values and norms. 
Thus, family background evidently plays an important role for the religiosity of 
denominational secondary school students. In the paper below, we make an attempt to 
separate the impact of these socialization factors not only for current pupils, but also for 
young adults. 
Theoretical background: secularization and age–period–cohort analysis 
Although its theoretical foundations are highly debated and it is often questioned if one 
can think about it as a coherent theory at all, secularization thesis has been one of the 
most influential interpretations of contemporary religious decline for a long time3. 
Although it can hardly be generalized to all contemporary countries let alone the whole 
of Europe, the case of present-day Hungary can actually be regarded as an empirical 
evidence to secularization thesis. 
An explanation of the gradual unchurching from the aspect of socialization is that 
consecutive cohorts are exposed to different kinds of religious socialization. Many 
scholars agree that the level of religiosity is apparently quite stable within cohorts 
(Crockett & Voas, 2006; Voas & Doebler, 2011; Wolf, 2008). Thus, if consecutive cohorts 
experience a decreasing religious socialization, the rate of religious people will be 
declining. 
Another phenomenon having an impact in the opposite direction is the effect of age, 
often described as life-cycle effect. As a consequence of this, an increasing religiosity can 
be observed in all age groups as people are getting older (Tomka, 2010). This means that 
the overall decline of religious sub-population is slowed down by the older cohorts 
becoming more and more religious4. However, when looking at the youth, a different 
                                                 
3 We already attempted to briefly overview secularization thesis and some of the counter-arguments on it 
in a previous paper (Hámori, 2011, pp. 16–17). Tomka (2011) provides an exhaustive summary of the 
topic. 
4 As it was pointed out in the introduction, despite this the number of believers in Hungary is falling. The 
reason for this according to Tomka (2009, 2010) may be that cohort-effect is greater, that is, the declining 
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kind of life–cycle effect can be assumed. People in the age of post-adolescence often turn 
to be less religious, which can be explained by the fact that the impact of basic agents of 
socialization (especially that of the family and the school) weakens. 
Secularization thesis is often criticized for assuming that the disappearance of religion is 
an irreversible process. In contrast, one can easily observe temporary religious 
upsurges. Such fluctuating changes can be explained by period-effect or historical effect. 
From this aspect, changes in religiosity are resulting from historical events which have 
the same impact on all cohorts. Undoubtedly political transition in the post-socialist 
countries was exactly of this kind. However, as it has been pointed out above, freedom of 
conscience did not necessarily result in growing religiosity (Müller, 2011). 
Following a religious upsurge during the late 80s and early 90s, religiosity has been 
declining for the past two decades in Hungary. At the same time some indicators of 
individual religiosity such as belief in God have evidently risen. Thus, religious change in 
Hungary can be well characterized by the theories of religious individualization and 
religious privatization (Rosta, 2008, 2011, 2012). Considering the adult cohorts a 
decline of church religiosity can be explained by cohort effects, whereas growing 
individual religiosity can be the result of within-cohort changes (Rosta, 2007). As for the 
cohorts growing up after the political transition, a freer environment for religious 
practice and religious education as well as the growing number of denominational 
schools make a positive cohort-effect plausible5. 
Considering the above, we try to answer the following research questions: (1) What are 
the main characteristics of religious change among the Hungarian youth? Is there a 
similar pattern of slightly declining church religiosity like that of the whole adult 
population? (2) Is there a lifecycle-effect of religious change among young people, 
resulting in (a) significantly higher church religiosity among the youngest age-groups 
compared to the older ones, and in (b) significantly higher church religiosity of young 
people still in secondary school compared to the same birth cohorts at a later point of 
time? (3) Are there cohort-specific differences concerning the level of religiosity? Are 
the younger cohorts socialized under the circumstances of religious freedom more 
religious than the older ones? (4) How can we assess the impact of the denominational 
schools on the religiosity of the youth? 
                                                                                                                                                        
religiosity of successive cohorts, than lifecycle-effect. Moreover, in the most recent period it was just the 
most religious elderly population that passed. 
5 A possible interpretation of this controversial process is that a different kind of religiosity may exist in 
the age groups. Consequently, the direction and pace of change is also different. The older generations are 
still attached to a more traditional folk religiosity, and changes among them can be characterized as 
secularization process. Religiosity of younger cohorts is more typically based on personal choice, thus 
religious changes can be modelled as “religious market” of churches competing for the faithful (Hámori 
2011). 
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To answer these questions we make a secondary analysis of the data of the Hungarian 
National Youth Study waves 2000, 2008, and 2012 (Ifjúság, 2000, 2008; Magyar Ifjúság, 
2012)6. The Hungarian National Youth studies have been based on representative 
samples of Hungarian young people between 15 and 29 including 8000 respondents in 
each wave in every fourth year since 2000. The study has been based on standardized 
survey and its samples has been representative to national, regional and county level, 
domicile type, age groups, as well as gender. In 2008, certain questions on religiosity 
were asked only to representative sub–samples of 4000 (in some cases 2000). Though 
the Hungarian Youth study has not been a research into the sociology of religion, yet all 
waves included a set of questions of religiosity. 
Changes of church religiosity 
Results of the Hungarian Youth studies show that between 2000 and 2012 church 
religious identity significantly dropped among young people between 15 and 29 (Figure 
2). The rate of those attending church service weekly or more frequently has almost 
been halved (from 7 to 4%), just like that of those attending church at least once a 
month (from 16 to 9%). Considering that the total number of this age group has also 
decreased by about 442 thousand since 2001 (Domokos, 2013, p. 14), one can conclude 
that the net decline is even higher. At the same time, the rate of those never attending 
church has raised from 36 to 46%. 
The fact that the youth are turning their backs on religion is mirrored not only by church 
attendance but also by indicators of personal commitment. The rate of those having a 
religious persuasion according to the teaching of the church has been reduced from 10 
to 7%. Somewhat surprisingly, at the same time, the share of people religious “in their 
own way” has also decreased from 46 to 31%. Sided by a stable share of 7-8% of those 
having an explicitly anti-religious persuasion, only the rate of one single group increased 
significantly which is that of the group of those identifying themselves as “not religious”, 
thus distancing themselves from churches and expressing a disinterest in religion. The 
share of those claiming to be raised in a religious family has also dropped from 37 to 
27%. 
  
                                                 
6 In the 2004 wave, the majority of the questions on religiosity were raised to a special subsample, which 
made the comparison of the results of this wave meaningless. 
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Figure 2. Change in church religiosity of youth aged 15–297 
 
Source: Ifjúság, 2000; Magyar Ifjúság, 2012 
The question should be raised here whether it is lifecycle-effect or cohort-effect that is 
explaining these trends. As represented in Figure 3, the share of those attending church 
monthly or more frequently was the highest in the youngest age groups in 2000, in 2008 
as well as in 2012, although these figures already show a declining religiosity of the 
youngest age groups (25%, 16% and 15% respectively). Contrasted to them, the older 
age groups were significantly less religious at each point of time, although the difference 
between them slightly diminished throughout the examined time period (7 percentage 
points in 2000 and only 2 in 2008 and in 2012). However, within-cohort decrease is 
astonishing. Considering the cohort born between 1984 and 1985, the drop of the share 
of those attending church at least monthly was as high as 16 percentage points between 
2000 and 2008, a really outstanding decline even though the trend was the same in all 
other age groups as well. Between 2008 and 2012 similar changes with smaller intensity 
took place in the youngest age groups, but the share of frequent churchgoers remained 
stable in the older cohorts.8 
  
                                                 
7 100% = all respondents. 
8 The overall share of those without a valid answer (”don´t know”/refusal) has slightly increased from 6% 
(2000) and 3% (2008) to 9% (2012) of all respondents. In order to ignore possible effects of the 
increasing number of missing answers, Figure 3 shows percentages of valid answers. 
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Figure 3. Frequency of church attendance by birth cohorts 
 
Source: Ifjúság, 2000 and 2008; Magyar Ifjúság, 2012 
In summary, although a significantly higher level of religiosity can be observed in all 
three waves when examining the youngest cohorts compared to the older ones, these 
differences diminished throughout the time period. The cohort aged 15-16 in 2000, 
which appeared to be the most religious, turned away from religion when they became 
23-24 in 2008 to such an extent that by then they were less religious than those aged 15-
16 in 2008. Religious socialization apparently affects a shrinking share of young people, 
and even those having attended church services regularly as a child tend to turn their 
backs on the church in great numbers during their late teen ages9. Thus, declining 
religiosity among Hungarian youth is a result of both within– and inter–cohort changes. 
The role of the agents of socialization  
As it can be seen in Figure 2, the share of those claiming to have been raised in a 
religious environment has dropped from 36% to 26%10. In a previous paper, we already 
assumed that this might be due to the changing socialization environment (Hámori & 
Rosta 2011, p. 252). Of course, socialization process takes place not only in the family 
but also in other groups and institutions, such as peer groups, mass media and school. 
Although there were no measures of religiosity of the peers applied, we still have data 
on whether the respondent attended a denominational school by the time of the survey 
both from the 2000 and 2008 waves11. On the basis of this, it is possible to scrutinize 
closely the role of family background and denominational education in forming a 
religious commitment. 
                                                 
9 Evidence for similar age effects among young adults on the basis of adult samples were shown by Nagy 
(2010). 
10 The rate of non-respondents was 8,8% in 2000 and 8,1% in 2012. 
11 Unfortunately, the 2012 wave of the study did not contain questions on the type of school that was 
attended by the respondent. 
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As it has been shown earlier in this paper, while denominational schools have an impact 
only on a marginal, though slowly increasing, part of youth, religious socialization within 
the family affects a much greater, though declining, part of young people. The question is 
what kind of an effect these mean together and what the role of each is for a youngster 
in becoming or remaining religious. 
To answer the question we first divided respondents of the 2008 wave into four 
groups:(1) young people with religious upbringing and having attended a 
denominational school; (2) young people with religious upbringing only and not having 
attended a denominational school; (3) young people without religious upbringing, but 
having attended a denominational school; (4) young people with no religious upbringing 
and not having attended a denominational school. 
We compare the religious identity of these four groups in Figure 4 (using the five–item 
scale developed by Miklós Tomka, see Tomka, 1973, 1998b), and the frequency of their 
church–going on Figure 5. 
Figure 4. Religious self-assessment by religious upbringing and denominational school attendance. 
 
Source: Ifjúság 2008 
These figures show that the presence of the two socialization factors together can make 
the religious commitment the most probable. More than half of those who got a religious 
upbringing and studied at least one year in a denominational school attend church 
service at least monthly, whereas only 2% of those are regular church-goers who gained 
no similarly religious socialization previously. Looking at this latter group, more than 
two-third (69%) of them were uncertain about their religious identity or explicitly non-
religious, while the same identity got only an 8% share of those who received religious 
incentives both from their family and the school12. 
                                                 
12 On the basis of the current research, it cannot be decided whether a religious educational institution 
should be regarded as a cause of stronger religious commitment, or the religion brought from home is the 
reason both for current religiosity and the choice of school. 
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The two effects clearly reinforce each other, but it can be argued which is more 
significant. This can be explored by comparing the religiosity of the groups exposed only 
to one of these effects. Of those who attended a denominational school but gained no 
religious upbringing, only 4% are church religious and almost half of them (48%) are 
religious in their own way. Albeit both figures are higher than those of the group gaining 
no religious incentives at all (1% and 30% respectively), these are considerably lower 
than those of the group having a religious upbringing yet attending no denominational 
school. Among them, 17% are committed believers according to the church’s teachings, 
and they have shown the highest share of those believing in their own way (68%). 
A similar tendency of the frequency of church-attendance is apparent in Figure 5. 
Although we can see an almost identical share of weekly church-going within those who 
were exposed to a religious socialization only either in their family or by a 
denominational school (7% and 8% respectively), the rate of those attending church 
service at least monthly is almost double (22%) within those having only a religious 
upbringing compared to those attending a denominational school only (10%). 
Figure 5. Frequency of church-attendance by religious upbringing and denominational school attendance. 
 
Source: Ifjúság 2008 
Thus, as a preliminary assumption we can state that a religious family background has a 
more significant role in becoming religious, whereas the denominational school has 
been shown to have a significantly lower efficiency in providing a religious education 
which the young did not receive in the family. A linear regression model can help to 
separate the intensity of these effects within each age groups (See Table 1). 
As explanatory variables of the model, we have built in age, gender, domicile and 
number of own children of the respondents, the father’s highest level of education, and 
some indicators of living independently (being employed, living in an independent 
household). Of course, we included data on religious upbringing as well as studying in a 
denominational school, too. As outcome variable, we measured religiosity by an 
indicator of the frequency of church attendance. 
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As it has been clearly verified by the model, the two religious socialization factors had a 
significant effect both in the whole examined group (aged 15–29, last column in Table 1) 
and in the three sub-groups (aged 15–19, 20–24, and 25–29). Moreover, religious family 
background had a higher positive impact in all three age-groups compared to the 
denominational schools. Both factors had the strongest effect on the youngest age group 
(15–19). 
Generally, the effect of the other explanatory variables was far less significant. Practicing 
one’s religion was unaffected by whether living independently. It seems only that with a 
father having a higher level degree, a more frequent church-attendance is more 
probable13. 
Confirming our expectations, the negative effect of age is less salient than that of the 
sources of socialization. Dividing the sample into sub-groups by age, lifecycle-effect 
remains significant only in the youngest group, which results in a decreasing religiosity 
by the age advancing. 
Table 1. Explanatory models of the frequency of church attendance by age groups, 2008 (standardized linear regression 
coefficients) 
 
Reference categories: settlement type = 0-1999 inhabitants, father’s highest level of education = primary school  
* sig. p < 0.05, **sig. p < 0.01, n.s.: non-significant 
Conclusions 
Indicators of church religiosity measured by the Hungarian youth studies in 2000, 2008, 
and 2012 have shown a significant drop in a relatively short period of time. In contrast, 
it has not been the share of respondents religious in their own way or having an anti-
                                                 
13 This is another evidence for a trend of elitisation of the religious part of the society. For more literature 
on this process among the youth see Hámori & Rosta (2011), and Rosta (2002, 2013). 
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religious identity that has grown but that of those being indifferent towards religion. 
Though the youngest group aged 15-16 seems to be more religious compared to the 
older ones, the difference between them was better-marked in 2000 than in 2008 or in 
2012. Looking at the older cohorts, however, one can hardly find a significant difference. 
Comparing cohorts examined both in 2000 and 2008, a huge decline in religiosity is 
apparent in the youngest one. There is a diminishing trend in the older cohorts too, but 
to a lesser extent. Similar trends are to be witnessed in 2012 too. Considering that no 
comparable decline has been observed in the adult cohorts so far, we can assume that 
this within-cohort change was due to a life-cycle effect typical for young ages rather than 
a period-effect. 
Comparing the effect of different socialization factors examined by the Hungarian youth 
studies, it seems that the impact of family background is significantly stronger than that 
of the denominational schools. The effect of this socialization background appears to be 
somewhat weaker in the older cohorts. There is a higher probability of church religiosity 
in the case of youngsters getting both a religious motivation from the family and the 
denominational school. However, on the basis of the existing survey data it cannot be 
decided whether it is because denominational school reinforces the effect of religious 
upbringing or because highly religious families tend to enrol their children to 
denominational schools. In any case, these schools can hardly fulfil the expected re-
evangelization function for children from non-religious families. Although a lifecycle-
effect is evidently present in the surveyed age-group, the effect of becoming 
independent from the parental household on religiosity is barely detectable. 
If we combine our results on the importance of religious upbringing in the family with 
the declining share of those who receive such socialization, a further decline of 
religiosity among the Hungarian youth seems fairly probable. 
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